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Detrimental Conduct: Why NFL Owners May Lose to Win
ABSTRACT
“Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!” the Wizard of Oz exclaimed as Toto
pulled back the green cloth that disguised the Wizard’s identity.1 To Dorothy’s dismay, the Wizard
of Oz concealed his true self, deciding to work in the shadows by directing attention to other
artificial realities.
On February 1, 2022, Brian Flores, the former head coach of the Miami Dolphins, pulled
the curtain back on Dolphins’ owner Stephen Ross, alleging that Ross directed Flores to “tank”
the season by offering Flores “$100,000 for every loss” during the 2019 season so that the team
would secure a higher draft pick.
This article explains why the unidirectional view of sports betting corruption, namely
player misconduct, is misguided. Instead, attention should be re-focused to team owners’
misconduct. During a time of great economic expansion in the NFL due to legalized sports
gambling, special scrutiny must be levied against inside individuals who can shape outcomes, such
as NFL franchise owners. This paper will argue that the Sports Bribery Act is not up to the task to
patrol this problem, and the law must be rewritten to reframe the issue of fixing games from the
players’ on-field performance to the whispers of the owner’s front office.
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The Wizard of Oz (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
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My main job as NFL Commissioner is to “protect the shield.”2
“Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?”3

Introduction
In 1933, Art Rooney, an avid horse race gambler, paid $2,500 to the National Football
League (“NFL”) to secure a new football franchise in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 4 Rooney called
his new team the Pirates, after Major League Baseball’s (“MLB”) Pittsburgh Pirates, in an effort
to boost interest, recognition, and game attendance among Pittsburgh’s citizens. 5 Shortly
thereafter, in 1935, Rooney placed a parlay bet at Saratoga Race Course, winning $50,000.6
Rooney used his winnings to bankroll the Pirates through the 1941 season, when they were
rebranded as the Pittsburgh Steelers.7 In 2021, the Pittsburgh Steelers were valued at $3.4 billion. 8
This article argues that today’s NFL team owners possess outsized and disproportionate
power over the activities of their teams and the NFL. Some owners, such as the Rooneys, are
responsible owners who are dedicated to celebrating and promoting the game of football. 9 But

Roger Goodell, the current NFL Commissioner, frequently states that “protecting the shield” is his primary concern
yet is commonly criticized for accommodating team owners’ misconduct while punishing player misconduct . See
Christopher L. Gasper, It’s clear Roger Goodell raised the shield to protect those who have tarnished it of late —the
NFL’s owners, Boston Globe (Feb. 9, 2022, 07:57PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/02/09/sports/its-clearroger-goodell-raised-shield-protect-those-who-have-tarnished-it-late-nfls-owners/; Ian O’Connor, Roger Goodell at
10 years: Time to put ‘players first’ ESPN, (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/17232122/rogergoodell-nfl-commissioner-10-years-protect-player-safety-first-improve-legacy.
3 Latin translations include “Who will guard the guards themselves” or “who watches the watchmen?” Attributed to
the Roman poet Juvenal’s Satires. Juvenal, Satires VI, lines 347-48. (1st Century A.D.)
4 Vince Johnson, Rooney Unique in Pro Football Hall of Fame, Pittsburgh Gazette, (Sept. 7, 1964), republished Sept.
30, 2007, https://www.post-gazette.com/sports/steelers/2007/09/30/From -the-PG-Archives-Rooney-Unique-in-ProFootball-Hall-of-Fame/stories/200709300174.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 NFL Team Valuations, Forbes, (August 2021), https://www.forbes.com/teams/pittsburghsteelers/?sh=2426cbb14cd6.
9 The Rooney Rule, which is the basis of Brian Flores’ race discrimination lawsuit against the NFL, is named after
Art Rooney. The Rule intended to bring racial diversity and inclusivity into NFL team front offices and coaching
positions by requiring NFL teams to interview at least one minority candidate f or their open coaching positions. See
2
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recent developments, including bribery allegations against Miami Dolphins owner Stephen Ross
and Cleveland Browns owner Jimmy Haslam, demonstrate that the NFL and federal law are not
adequately prepared to handle major misconduct of some of the most powerful individuals in
professional sports. Allegations of owners paying their coaches to lose games strikes at the heart
of the integrity of the sport at a time when it is undergoing great economic change due to the
legalization of sports gambling.
In part one, the article explains the importance of maintaining game integrity in the NFL
and addresses the potential consequences of losing public confidence in NFL games. Part two
explores, through the lens of game integrity, how the NFL is unwilling and unable to punish owner
sports gambling violations and further posits that the NFL cannot adequately punish any owner
misconduct. Part three argues that the Sports Bribery Act is insufficient to protect against
misconduct from team owners. Part four recommends solutions to this problem through changes
in federal law and a public re-framing of corruption in professional sports.
It is time to reorient the conversation of corruption in sports from player misconduct to
owner misconduct, rewrite the Sports Bribery Act, and deploy innovative legal methods such as
employing consumer fraud laws so that powerful offenders are not shielded by their fellow owners
and antiquated statutes. If the NFL’s team owners, the de facto guardians of the game, cannot
guard against corruption, outside institutions such as the United States Congress must intervene to
preserve this beloved American institution.

The Rooney Rule, NFL Football Operations, https://operations.nfl.com/inside-football-ops/diversity-inclusion/therooney-rule/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
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PART I: The Integrity of the Game
I.

The Origins of the NFL & Sports Corruption in the United States.

When the New York Nine beat the Knickerbocker Base Ball Club by a score of 23-1 at
Elysian Fields in Hoboken, New Jersey on October 6, 1846, the players knew they were forming
a new kind of game.10 But little did they know it would morph into Major League Baseball, the
oldest professional sports league in the world, which in 2019 took in $10.7 billion dollars in
revenue.11 The National Football League followed a similar trajectory. Formed in 1920 as the
American Professional Football Association, the league consisted of fourteen teams from four
states,12 and operated in relative rural obscurity during its early years. 13 Today, the NFL consists
of thirty-two franchises, and took in $18 billion dollars in revenue during the 2021 season.14 The
NFL now outperforms MLB in sponsorship revenue, playoff revenue, and viewership season after
season.15 What began as a pastoral game in Canton, Ohio grew into an economic sports and

10 See The First Baseball Game,

https://nj.gov/nj/about/baseball.html#:~:text=On%20June%2019%2C%201846%2C%20at,the%20Knickerbockers%
20as%20they%20appeared; National League of Baseball Is Founded, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/this-dayin-history/national-league-of-baseball-is-founded (last visited Mar. 16, 2022); American League, Encyclopedia
Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/American-League (last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
11 The Football Association, commonly abbreviated FA, was founded in 1863 in England. The FA was solely amateur
until 1885 when the league began paying its players due to the creation of a rival league. See generally R.W. Lewis,
Touched Pitch and Been Shockingly Defiled: Football, Class, Social Darwinism, and Decadence in England, 1880 1914, in J.A. Mangan, Sport in Europe: Politics, Class, Gender, (Frank Cass, London), pp. 117-143. See also Maury
Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion In Revenues For 2019 , Forbes (Dec. 21, 2019, 07:02AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb -sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for2019/?sh=194d73f05d78.
12 Mark Craig, From humble beginnings grew traditional powers, StarTribune (Jan. 30, 2011, 11:48PM)
https://www.startribune.com/from -humble-beginnings-grew-traditional-powers/114910274/
13 Scott E. Backman, NFL Players Fight for Their Freedom: The History of Free Agency in the NFL, 9 Sports LAW,
J. 1 (2002).
14 In March 2010, Roger Goodell announced his goal was to increase NFL revenue to $25 billion in yearly revenue by
2027. According to Sportico, the NFL will take in $25 billion by 2025, largely from last year’s $113 billion over 11
years media deal with CBS, Fox, NBC, Disney, and Amazon. See Kurt Badenhausen, Goodell’s $25 Billion Revenue
Goal Remains In NFL’s Sights, Sportico (Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.sportico.com/leagues/football/2022/goodell25-billion-revenue-goal-global-nfl-1234661705/; see also Jabari Young, NFL ready to start the 2021 season – here’s
what’s happening with the league’s business on and off the field , CNBC, (Sept. 8, 2021, 05:57PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/08/nfl-2021-season-whats-happening-with-the-leagues-business.html.
15 Despite fielding only 256 regular season games compared to MLB’s 2,430 matches, the NFL received $1.32 billion
in sponsorship revenue in the 2017-18 season. In comparison, MLB’s sponsorship revenue was $892 million. Mike
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entertainment behemoth that commands the most attention and market power of any American
professional sport.
A. The Origins of the Owners
During the 1920s, the NFL primarily operated in Midwestern and Mid-Atlantic cities such
as Buffalo, Canton, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Rochester, and Chicago. 16 In 1925, eager to break
into the larger coastal cities, NFL President Joe Carr approached Tim Mara,17 who operated a
gambling operation consisting of several horse racetracks in the New York area.18 With little
convincing, Mara bought the New York Giants football team for $500.19 Several other NFL teams
were founded with money acquired by gambling, with ties to organized crime, or with individuals
associated with both, including the Chicago Cardinals, the Cleveland Browns, the Dallas
Cowboys, the Baltimore Colts, the Los Angeles Rams, the San Francisco 49ers, and the Oakland
Raiders.20 Money, power, and gambling is a common thread that runs with the team owners from
the infancy of the NFL to the current NFL. Yet, today’s owners are remarkably different than the
founding owners of the NFL.
The owners who founded NFL teams in the 1920s and 1930s started teams by paying a
meager franchise fee and operated their teams by squeezing the most out of their lowly budgets. 21
These owners achieved wealth through the success of their franchises. But beginning in the early
1990s, the financial landscape of the NFL changed considerably. For the first time, already ultra-

Lukas, NFL vs. MLB: Revenue, Salaries, Viewership, Attendance and Ratings, WSN, (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.wsn.com/nfl/nfl-vs-mlb/.
16 Timothy O’Brien, Bad Bet, (Random House 1998) 238-240.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 In the 1968 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the minimum salary was set at $9,000 for rookies and $10,000 for
veterans. Players were paid $50 dollars for exhibition games. See 1960s: AFL vs. NFL, NFLPA, NFLPA,
https://nflpa.com/about/history/1960s-afl-vs-nfl.
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wealthy individuals began purchasing teams or making new ones. Jerry Jones, the oil energy
magnate, purchased the Dallas Cowboys in February 1989 for $140 million.22 At the time, the
Cowboys were the worst team in the NFL, with home game attendance declining for five straight
years.23 Jones quickly turned the team around, both on the field and in the bank, sending the
Cowboys to the Superbowl in 1993, 1994, and 1996. 24 Financially, Jones was even more
successful. He doubled the price of game tickets, eliminated 2,500 seats, and inserted one hundred
luxury suites into Texas Stadium.25 Jones’s revenue from Texas Stadium skyrocketed from
$700,000 in 1992 to $30 million in 1993.26 But Jones did not stop at stadium revenue. He inked
team sponsorship deals with Pepsi and Nike, thereby violating sponsorship deals NFL Properties
already had in place with Coca-Cola and Reebok.27 The NFL sued Jones for $300 million to enjoin
him from executing his sponsorship deals; in response, Jones countersued for $750 million, and
the NFL withdrew its claim.28 Jerry Jones ushered in a new era of NFL ownership trademarked by
unapologetic spending, immense growth, and windfall profits.
In 1993, coinciding with Jones’ lawsuit, the NFL announced two new franchises, in
Charlotte, North Carolina and Jacksonville, Florida. 29 Between 1993 and 1995, the New England
Patriots, Philadelphia Eagles, and Miami Dolphins were all sold for prices between $160 to $173
million.30 Other owners followed Jones’ template. Buoyed by new national television contracts,
owners entered a new era of stadium building with luxury boxes.31 If cities refused to financially

Michael Oriard, Brand NFL: Making and Selling America’s Favorite Sport (2007). p. 150.
Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 151.
28 Id.
29 The Carolina Panthers and Jacksonville Jaguars franchises arrived at a cost $140 million each. Prior to their entrance
to the NFL, the last teams to enter were Seattle and Tampa Bay in 1976 at a cost of $16 million. Id.
30 Id. at 152.
31 Television deals ballooned from $900 million in 1990 to $2.2 billion in 1998. Id. at 153.
22
23
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aid stadium construction or provide tax breaks to franchises, owners threatened, and sometimes
did, move their teams to other cities.32 The NFL is powerless to restrict the movement of its teams,
so owners pursued the profits, building new stadiums in their current cities or uprooting their
fanbases and shipping their teams to new cities. Between 1992 and 2010, twenty-one teams moved
into new stadiums.33 The relocations, new stadiums, and television contracts paid off handsomely
for the owners. Today, Jerry Jones is worth $8.9 billion. Including Jones, thirteen NFL franchise
owners are worth more than three billion dollars each. 34
For instance, the owner of the Carolina Panthers, David Tepper, is a hedge fund manager
and is the one-hundred-forty-second richest individual in the world, with a wealth of fourteen and
one half billion dollars.35 The second wealthiest owner is Stanley Kroenke. 36 Kroenke operates a
sports and entertainment umbrella company that owns several professional sports teams including
the Premier League’s Arsenal Football Club, the NBA’s Denver Nuggets, the NHL’s Colorado
Avalanche, and the NFL’s Los Angeles Rams. 37 Stephen Ross, the Miami Dolphins owner who
faces sports bribery accusations, achieved wealth through global real estate development. 38 Ross
is worth $8.4 billion.39 Jimmy Haslam, the owner of the Cleveland Browns, who is also accused
of sports bribery, is worth $3 billion.40 The NFL owners of today constitute a handful of the
wealthiest and most powerful individuals throughout the United States and the world.

32

In 1995, the Los Angeles Rams moved to St. Louis after the City of St. Louis offered generous financial incentives,
the owner of the Houston Oilers moved his team to Nashville, and the owner of the Cleveland Browns moved his team
to Baltimore. In 1998, the NFL granted a new team for Cleveland for $530 million. A year later, Houston re -received
a franchise, the Texans, for $700 million. Id. at 153.
33 Id.
34 John Breech, NFL’s richest owners revealed for 2021: Panthers, Cowboys and Rams top list of teams with wealthiest
owners, CBS Sports, (Apr. 9, 2021, 01:26PM), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/draft/news/2022-nfl-mock-draftseahawks-leapfrog-panthers-falcons-to-grab-qb1-chargers-move-up-for-top-pass-blocker/.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Kroenke is married to the heiress of the Walmart fortune, Ann Walton. Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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B. The Structure of the NFL
NFL owners have a long history of exercising almost complete control over their players.41
Since the NFL’s beginning, team owners limited player rights by including restrictive clauses in
the NFL Constitution, the NFL By-laws, and the NFL standard player contracts.42 As the league
gained popularity by the mid-nineteenth century, players began to challenge the owners’ vice-likegrip on players’ rights in court.
The first challenge came in 1957, when William Radovich sued the NFL arguing that the
league violated antitrust laws.43 The United States Supreme Court ruled in Radovich’s favor,
subjecting the NFL, unlike the MLB, to the Sherman Antitrust Act,44 laying the groundwork for
the push for free agency arguments almost twenty years later. The owners, fearing outside forces
such as the courts would restrain their authority, responded to Radovich by instituting a new rule
into the NFL Constitution, informally referred to as the Rozelle Rule, named after the NFL
Commissioner at the time, which required teams who signed a new player to compensate the
player’s former team for a negotiated price. If the teams could not agree to an amount, the
Commissioner would decide how much compensation was owed to the player’s former team.
Consequently, the Rozelle Rule, in effect, prevented players’ movement among different teams
simply because teams found it not in their best interest to sign free agent players.45 Between 1963

41

Scott E. Backman, NFL Players Fight for Their Freedom: The History of Free Agency in the NFL, 9 Sports LAW.
J. 1 (2002).
42 As a young league, NFL owners prevented players from joining other professional football leagues by enlisting a
boycott policy, whereby a player who left the NFL to play for a rival league would be prevented from playing in the
NFL for life. Id.
43 See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
44 Id.
45 The Rozelle Rule was codified in Section 12.1(H) of the NFL Constitution:
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall thereupon become a free agent and shall
no longer be considered a member of the team of that club following the expiration date of such contract.
Whenever a player, becoming a free agent in such manner, thereafter sign ed a contract with a different club
in the League, then, unless mutually satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the two League
clubs, the Commissioner may name and then award to the former club one or more players, from the Active,
Reserve, or Selection List (including future selection choices) of the acquiring club as the Commissioner in
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and 1974, only thirty-four players signed with new teams. The Rozelle Rule effectively artificially
deflated player salaries by preventing a competitive market for players to arise.
In 1968, the National Labor Relations Board certifed the National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA) as the “official bargaining representative of all NFL players.” 46 The players
challenged the Rozelle Rule in 1975, winning the first big victory for players against owner control
in Mackey v. NFL.47 Unfortunately for the players, the owners instituted the Right of First Refusal
System just after the Mackey ruling, which further hindered players’ ability to change teams.48 It
was not until the signing of the 1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement, at the same time as
Cowboys owner Jerry Jones’ countersuit against the NFL for $750 million, did the players receive
full free agency rights.49 For the first time in NFL history, players could move freely throughout
the NFL from team to team.
It took almost seventy years for NFL players to gain to permit free agency; and the rise of
free agency fundamentally changed the NFL on multiple fronts. First, free agency shifted the
responsibility of team success from the players’ on-field performance to front office strategy. Since
teams could no longer hold elite players for the entirety of their career, owners and their front
office executives had to make strategic decisions about which players to pay, which players to

his sole discretion deems fair and equitable; any such decision by the Commissioner shall be final and
conclusive.
For example, in 1968, Commissioner Rozelle required the New Orleans Saints to relinquish two first round draft picks
to the San Francisco 49ers for signing former 49ers wide receiver Dave Parks, who had only caught twenty -six passes
the season prior to his signing with the Saints.
Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), aff’d, 543 F.2d 610, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 801 (1977).
46 See Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 74, 83 (D. Minn. 1974), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1978).
47 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610-11.
48 “A free agent’s original team held the right of first refusal, enabling it to retain a player by matching any contract
offer made by another team. The player’s original team was also entitled to draft choice compensation from the team
signing its player.” The History of NFL Free Agency, NFL, (Mar. 8, 2021, 05:41PM),
https://www.patriots.com/news/the-history-of-nfl-free-agency.
49 Vito Stellino, It’s official: NFL, union settle on CBA, The Baltimore Sun, (May 7, 1993, 12:00AM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-05-07-1993127183-story.html.

9

keep, and which players to trade. Second, the new competition for players increased the importance
of the NFL Draft. The Draft allows the NFL’s worst performing teams to acquire the best young
players from the collegiate level, ensuring that the NFL’s thirty-two teams remain competitive
among each other. Third, player salaries, no longer diminished by restrictive rules, ballooned
overnight. After the signing of the 1993 CBA, “the average salary of unrestricted free agents more
than doubled, from $517,000 to $1.044 million” and “restricted free agents’ salary leapt from
$293,000 to $780,000.”50 These changes brought significantly higher salaries for the players, but
immensely higher profits for the owners, as demonstrated in the ever-increasing revenues from
luxury box sales, television deals, and corporate sponsorships. Legal sports gambling revenues
will continue to climb and pad the pockets of team owners by raising the value of their franchises.51
On a structural level, the NFL organized itself in a way different from other business
enterprises. Today’s NFL consists of thirty-two franchise teams, thirty-one of which are majority
or completely owned by ultrawealthy individuals.52 Each team provides one board member to the
NFL Executive Committee.53 This member is usually the majority owner. 54 The Executive
Committee votes on the most important matters in the NFL, ranging from selecting and removing
a commissioner, changing game rules, and changing team ownership.55 All votes for these weighty

50

Oriard, at 143.
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). As of February 1, 2022, the NFL’s Denver Broncos are up for sale. In 1984, Pat Bowlen
bought the team for $78 million dollars. Today, Forbes estimates the team’s worth at $3.7 billion dollars. The highest
price paid in history for an American professional sports team was $2.35 billion dollars for the sale of the NBA’s
Brooklyn Nets to Joseph Tsai in 2019. Vincent Del Giudice, NFL’s Denver Broncos Announce Team Is Officially Up
for Sale, Bloomberg (Feb. 1, 2022, 02:52PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-01/nfl-s-denverbroncos-going-up-for-sale-team-announces.
52 Green Bay Packers Inc. is the exception in the NFL. Since 1923, the Packers have been a publicly owned, nonprofit
corporation. Since they are publicly owned, the Packers are the only team who must publicly report their finances.
The team is governed by a board of directors and a seven -member executive committee. See Generally Green Bay
Packers Shareholders 2021 Stock Sale, https://www.packers.com/community/shareholders; see also NFL Football
Operations, https://operations.nfl.com/inside-football-ops/nfl-operations/integrity-of-the-game/.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
51
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topics require three-fourths majority to pass.56 In other words, the commissioner serves at the
behest of the owners, no rules can be altered without the owners approval, and most importantly,
no owner can be punished for misconduct unless more than seventy-five percent of the other
owners agree. For these reasons, the time is now to examine the role and influence of team owners
on the integrity of professional sports and introduce innovative mechanisms to hold rogue owners
accountable.
II.

Integrity of the Game is Necessary for the Survival of the NFL

A. Sport Integrity is Essential to the NFL’s Success

The NFL offers a unique entertainment choice for Americans. The main difference that
separates the NFL and other forms of entertainment such as movies, theater, and television is the
perception that professional football games have undetermined outcomes. Uncertain outcomes are
the reason why individuals who watch the NFL are fans and not merely viewers, why fans follow
their teams to different cities, and most importantly, why individuals place bets on games. To
maintain uncertain outcomes, professional American sports leagues require “uniform rules of the
game,” “competitive balance,” and “consistent and rational internal application of integrity of sport
rules by its governing body.”57 At a minimum, game integrity requires “fair and honest
performances and outcomes, unaffected by illegitimate enhancements or external interests.” 58 On
the other hand, game integrity does not extend to viewers’ ultimate satisfaction. Instead, viewers
are “entitled only to view whatever transpires” and possess no right to a sports game which is
56

Id.
Matthew J. Mitten, How Is the Integrity of Sport Protected in the United States, 19 TEX. REV. ENT. & Sports L.
89 (2019); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 105 (2d. Cir. 2012) (The cornerstones of sports require
“application of a uniform set of rules for competition” so that “play is fair in each game, that teams’ performances can
be compared across a season, and tha t teams can be distinguished in terms of quality.”)
58 National Integrity of Sport Unit, Austl. Gov’t Dep’t of Health,
https://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/national-integrity-of-sport-unit (Aug. 3. 2016).
57
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“exciting” or exhibits spectacular athletic performance. 59 In other words, an athletic competition
is supposed to be unpredictable and unscripted.

In the NFL, the Executive Committee sets the rules of the game so that every team follows
the same rules, competitive balance is maintained by the NFL Draft which gives the best new
players to the worst teams, and the NFL Commissioner applies the rules to the league’s members.
Dolphins owner Stephen Ross is accused of manipulating the NFL Draft by bribing the Dolphins
Head Coach to intentionally lose games so that the team would artificially receive a higher draft
pick. This behavior directly contravenes one of the central tenet’s of maintaining uncertain
outcomes in games: competitive balance. The uncertainty of how a game will transpire is the glue
that keeps people in the stadium seats and in front of their television night after night and season
after season. If the viewing public believes there is impropriety occurring during games and that
outcomes are predetermined, game viewership, game attendance, and football wagering will all
decline.
B. Shifting Sport Integrity Questions from the Field to the Owners’ Office
Most attention concerning sport integrity is given to player performance and players’
motivations to win games, take bribes, shave points, or throw games. 60 For the entire history of
sport integrity in the NFL, the emphasis has been on players’ susceptibility to gambling. The NFL

Bowers v. Fed’n Internationale de L’Automobile, 489 F.3d 316, 321-22 (7th Cir. 2007).
Much of the focus on player corruption can be attributed to the infamous “Black” Sox Scandal where several
Chicago White Sox players allegedly took bribes to lose the 1919 World Series from gangster Arnold “The Brain”
Rothstein. See generally Gene Carney, Burying the Black Sox: How Baseball’s Cover-Up of the 1919 World Series
Fix Almost Succeeded, Potomac Books (2007); Another incident that receives much attention is the Boston College
Men’s Basketball point shaving scheme, where several players of the basketball team took bribes to shave points,
benefiting gamblers’ profits during the 1978-79 season. Bart Barnes, Kuhn Gets 10-Year Sentence In BC Point Shaving
Case, Wash. Post (Feb. 6, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1982/02/06/kuhn-gets-10-yearsentence-in-bc-point-shaving-case/6dd15e0e-48a8-4ce8-a8ad-a5154b210f21/
59
60
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Commissioner possesses wide-ranging discretion to discipline players for sport integrity
infractions with his “best interests of the sport” power. 61 If the Commissioner acts within the
bounds of the league bylaws, constitution, and collective bargaining agreement, courts generally
give great deference to the Commissioner’s disciplinary decisions.62 Despite the emphasis on
players betting on games, only a handful of players have been disciplined for gambling. However,
when players face accusations of bribery or betting on games, the reaction by the NFL through the
owners is often swift and severe.
In 1963, two players, Paul Hornung of the Green Bay Packers and Alex Karras of the
Detroit Lions, placed bets on college and NFL games. 63 Commissioner Pete Rozelle levied yearlong suspensions and fined each player $2,000 dollars.64 Since 1963, only three other players faced
discipline for gambling, one in 1983, one in 2019, and one in 2022.65 Despite this scant record of
players violating the integrity of the game by gambling, all attention is given to players. The
spotlight should be widened and refocused to team owners because the owners possess the power
to directly manipulate what happens on the field more directly than individual players. For

61

Atlanta National League Baseball Club v. Kuhn , 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
Mitten, How is the Integrity of Sport Protected in the United States, 19 TEX. REV. ENT. & Sports L. 89, 103
(2019).
63 Peter King, How the NFL first addressed players gambling on games, NBC Sports (Dec. 2, 2019, 12:50PM),
https://sports.nbcsports.com/2019/12/02/how-the-nfl-first-addressed-players-gambling-on-games/.
64 Id.
65 David Brandt, Cardinals’ Josh Shaw Suspended for betting on NFL games, AP News (Nov. 29, 2019),
https://apnews.com/article/2dfff2fa4c1846c8861976f645d9d911 ; see Jonathan Barr, For the First Time in Decades,
NFL
Suspends
A
Player
For
Gambling
On
Football,
FORBES
(Nov.
30,
2019),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanberr/2019/11/30/nfl-suspends-player-for-gambling-on-football-for-the-firsttime-in-decades/?sh=201ec4a61970; On March 7, 2022, Atlanta Falcons wide receiver Calvin Ridley received a yearlong suspension from the NFL for placing bets on football games while he was not on the active roster. Commissioner
Goodell wrote a letter to Mr. Ridley stating, “There is nothing more fundamental to the NFL’s success —and to the
reputation of everyone with our league—than upholding the integrity of the game…Your actions put the integrity of
the game at risk, threatened to damage public confidence in professional football, and potentially undermined the
reputations of your fellow players throughout the NFL.” The NFL stated that no evidence was found that “any game
was compromised in any way.” See Michael Rothstein, NFL suspends Atlanta Falcons WR Calvin Ridley for at least
2022 season for betting on games, ESPN (Mar. 7, 2022), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/33446869/nflsuspends-atlanta-falcons-wr-calvin-ridley-least-2022-season-betting-games.
62
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example, NFL owners unilaterally dictate which front office executives to hire, which coaching
personnel to hire, which players to bench, and which players to draft. These decisions directly
affect a team’s performance on the field, and consequently, the outcome of games.
The NFL Commissioner serves at the satisfaction of the owners which disincentivizes the
commissioner’s office from investigating or punishing owner misconduct. As a result, team
owners and the Commissioner have always policed the behavior of players, but there is no internal
mechanism inside the NFL structure to police owners beside the owners themselves. For example,
after the 1919 World Series, the owner of the Chicago White Sox, Charles Comiskey, did not
renounce or quickly move against the eight players that were later nicknamed the “Black Sox”
after it was made public that several players on Comiskey’s team took bribes to intentionally lose
the World Series.66 Comiskey “gained the reputation as a person who turned a blind eye to
corruption in order to protect his profits.”67 Moreover, Comiskey’s stinginess regarding his
players’ salary is partially the reason why his players took bribes to lose the World Series.68
Despite this, the White Sox’s baseball stadium in Chicago was named Comiskey Park until 2003
and Charles Comiskey was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 1939, less than twenty years
after the Black Sox Scandal.69
The professional sports world has undergone monumental changes since the 1919 Black
Sox Scandal. In today’s NFL, free agency has driven up player salaries, and players are less
incentivized to take bribes or benefit from betting on games than in the past.70 Instead, players are
incentivized to play as well as possible, so they can sell their talents on the open market and extend
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the length of their playing careers. On the other hand, owners have every reason to protect and
maximize their long-term profits. Unfortunately, some owners resort to illegal tactics such as
withholding ticket revenue or attempting to throw games to acquire higher draft picks. 71 These
illicit activities are difficult to prevent and even more complicated to punish today because of the
lack of transparency between the teams and the league, the NFL Commissioner’s lack of power to
punish owners, and the immense wealth and power of the individual owners themselves. Since
NFL owners allegedly disregarded game integrity for private profit, the time is now to examine
ways of promoting integrity that also addresses owner misconduct.
PART II: The NFL’s Sports Gambling Policy Does Not Promote Game Integrity
Despite many owners purchasing their teams with gambling-related winnings, NFL owners
collectively fought fiercely against the legalization of sports betting in the United States for most
of the NFL’s existence in the name of preserving game integrity. Yet, the NFL takes contradictory
stances on sports gambling, preventing players from placing bets on any NFL games while
simultaneously allowing its owners to hold financial stakes in sports gambling companies. The
NFL’s inability and unwillingness to enforce the same gambling rules against players and team
owners suggests that the NFL cannot effectively protect the integrity of the game. NFL owners
achieved great wealth from sports gambling and currently invest in sports gambling ventures yet
control NFL team activities. Essentially, owners are given a free pass to financially benefit from
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gambling companies in violation of NFL rules when players are not. This reality is untenable now
that legal sports gambling is spreading across the United States, and further displays that the NFL
cannot and will not address owner misconduct.
A. The NFL’s Fight Against Legal Sports Gambling
No professional American sports league wants to face another incident like the 1919 Black
Sox Scandal. Consequently, Major League Baseball was the first American professional sports
league to establish the role of “commissioner” to police its players, and to give peace of mind to
fans who became skeptical of the honestness and trustworthiness of professional sports’ leaders
and players.72 Major League Baseball’s first commissioner, Kennesaw Mountain Landis, turned
out to be a steadying hand, and the other major sports leagues, including the NFL, implemented
the commissioner role in turn.73
For most of its history, the NFL relied on league power via the commissioner and political
lobbying to shape public policy in ways beneficial to the league.74 In 1991, after California
attempted to legalize sport gambling, the NFL lobbied Congress for a federal ban on sports
gambling.75 Shortly thereafter, in 1992, Florida sought to permit Floridians to bet on professional
football games.76 The legislation was derailed by “antigambling lobbyists…including individuals
who worked on behalf of the interests of the U.S. commercial sports leagues.” 77 Weeks later, a bill
titled the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) which prevented legalized
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sports gambling in all but four States, was proposed in Congress. During the congressional
deliberation of PASPA, the NFL argued that state-sponsored lotteries “would take the values of
the sports leagues and would alter them.”78 The NFL enlisted former linebacker Reggie Williams
to testify before Congress in favor of PASPA. Williams stated that “state-sponsored gambling
really would make a mockery of an athlete’s sacrifices and commitments.” 79 It only took a few
months from introducing PASPA to its signing.80 In principal and in practice, the NFL did not
tolerate sports betting in the name of game integrity.
B. NFL Owners Embrace Gambling Profits After PASPA’s Demise
NFL team owners possess inside information on their teams and the inner workings of the
league. Owners have the final word on all player decisions, personnel, hiring, and firing decisions.
Yet, some owners own stakes in sports gambling companies. Jerry Jones of the Dallas Cowboys
and Robert Kraft of the New England Patriots both hold financial stake in DraftKings. 81
Additionally, Kraft sits on the board of directors of Apollo Global Management, a New York
private equity firm.82 Apollo has a sixteen percent investment in Caesars Entertainment, one of the
largest sports gambling companies in the United States. 83 Apollo also owns Yahoo Sports, and is
currently shopping the market to merge Yahoo Sports with a sport betting company. 84 Kraft is
currently violating NFL gambling policy by sitting on a board of directors of a “gambling-related
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operation”, but the NFL has not enforced the policy against Kraft.85 In stark contrast, the NFL
punishes players who have any connection to casinos or gambling of any kind. For instance, the
NFL prohibits players from making promotional appearances at casinos or other gambling related
sites and has even fined players who arm wrestled for the Pro Football Arm Wrestling
Championship at a Las Vegas casino nightclub.86 In another instance, former NFL quarterback
Tony Romo was forced to cancel an appearance at the Venetian for a fantasy football event after
the NFL declared it would issue fines should Romo appear.87
The NFL is free to levy punishments against players who violate league policy. However,
the NFL does not apply the same standard to its owners as it does to its players. An NFL
commissioner unwilling or unable to control team owners who blatantly violate the NFL’s own
rules is not protecting game integrity, rather, is enabling violations of game integrity. Using NFL
gambling policy enforcement as a microcosm of larger NFL rule enforcement, it is clear the NFL
has a double standard for player and owner misconduct. In the absence of league enforcement of
policy, the only recourse to ensure owners do not undermine the integrity of the game is federal
and state law. Unfortunately, relevant federal law is not up to the task.
PART III: The Sports Bribery Act is Insufficient to deal with Owner Misconduct
The Sports Bribery Act of 1964 was the culmination of a crusade against player-related
gambling corruption that began with the 1919 World Series and continued throughout the early to
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mid-nineteenth century.88 When the Sports Bribery Act was signed, players were more susceptible
to bribes because they generally received lower pay, were not unionized, and did not enjoy free
agency rights. The Act aimed to “provide the authority our law enforcement agencies need to
prevent gamblers from corrupting college and professional sports.” 89 The Act was intended to “halt
the contamination of sports by organized gambling syndicates by punishing any players or officials
as well as gamblers who attempt to corrupt these games for personal gain.” 90 The pertinent
language of the Sports Bribery Act reads:
(a) Whoever carries into effect, attempts to carry into effect, or conspires with any
other person to carry into effect any scheme in commerce to influence, in any
way, by bribery any sporting contest, with knowledge that the purpose of such
scheme is to influence by bribery that contest, shall be fined under this title, or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.91

The Sports Bribery Act has only been used in sixteen federal prosecutions. 92 Of those, the majority
resulted in convictions of corrupt gamblers in horse racing.93 Not one case has been filed under
the Sports Bribery Act against any of the four major professional sports leagues in the United
States,94 and the Act has never been deployed against the owner of an NFL team.
In its fifty-eight-year history, the statute has only been used to prosecute organized crime
syndicates, players, and gamblers. The cases can be divided into two categories: score alteration
cases and outcome determination cases.
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A. Score Alteration Prosecutions Under the Sports Bribery Act
Two of the most notable cases stem from the 1979 Boston College Men’s Basketball point
shaving scheme.95 In the scheme, members of organized crime paid basketball players to keep
game scores within a pre-agreed upon margin. This “fixing” allowed bookies to secure windfall
profits by altering the game on the court to fit their betting preferences. 96 At the center of the
scheme were a middleman from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania who was a high school friend of a Boston
College Basketball player, two informed mobsters from New York City who offered protection
for the corrupt bookmakers, and several Boston College basketball players who would receive
payments, usually $2,500 per fixed game, to shave points. 97 This conspiracy did not involve
predetermining the winner or reducing the uncertainty of outcome of the game. Rather, the scheme
narrowed or largened the margin of victory for Boston College so that gamblers could win large
profits through point-spread manipulation.
A more recent Sports Bribery Act score alteration prosecution arose out of a collegiate
basketball and football point shaving scheme during the 2004-2006 seasons at the University of
Toledo.98 Wealthy businessmen and avid gamblers Ghazi Manni and Mitchell Karam paid both
basketball and football players various sums of money, ranging from $10,000 to $40,000 to shave
points so that the two men could profit handsomely off the point spread. 99 In 2008 and 2009, Manni
and Karam, as well as seven athletes at the University of Toledo, faced indictments for shaving
points as part of Manni and Karam’s conspiracy. 100 All players pled guilty.101
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Two years later, three running backs from the University of Toledo pleaded guilty to fixing
games for Manni and Karam.102 One of the players, Quinton Broussard, “intentionally fumbled the
football “in exchange for $500” during the “GMAC Bowl against Texas-El Paso.”103 Despite the
fumble, Toledo won the game handedly by a score of 45-13.104 Much like the mobsters in the
Boston College scheme, Manni and Karam tailored scoring margins to their betting preferences so
that they would privately profit on their bets. Although this conduct is reprehensible and criminal,
it did not directly alter the ultimate outcome of the games. Schemes that do affect the result of a
game, however, can also be prosecuted under the Act.
B. Outcome Determination Prosecutions Under the Sports Bribery Act
Richie “the Bull” Melito, Jr. was a boxer from Landover, Maryland who unknowingly
benefitted from fixed fights from 1995 through 2000.105 Promoter Robert Mitchell and boxer
Thomas Williams “arranged” for at least eleven fights during this five-year period to be fixed in
Melito, Jr.’s favor so that his professional boxing career would flourish.106 In 2005, prosecutors
indicted and convicted Mitchell for arranging at least $70,000 dollars of bribes to be given to at
least seven different boxers during the five-year period.107 Although the Sports Bribery Act has
been used infrequently, it has been effective to prosecute players and outside actors in match fixing
events such as college sports, horse racing, and boxing.
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The Melito boxing case is different from the Boston College or the Toledo point shaving
schemes, and is far more detrimental to professional sports. The fixed boxing scandal is much
more like the allegations faced by NFL team owners Stephen Ross and Jimmy Halsam. Both
instances involve paying one side of a sporting contest to intentionally lose for personal gain. In
the former, a boxer’s career would be artificially created to bring him fame, fortune, and a
fantastical career. In the latter, an owner’s football team would secure the best college football
player in the next NFL Draft if the team lost as many games as possible during the prior season.
The fight fixing should be likened to the owners’ offering their head coaches to lose games because
both have the same genesis: both come from the top down. In the boxing conspiracy, Richie “the
Bull” Melito, Jr. did not know he was fighting in a fixed boxing match. Instead, his promoter,
Robert Mitchell, paid off his opponents in advance. Similarly, Miami Dolphins owner Stephen
Ross allegedly met with his head coach and stated that he wanted the team to “tank,” and he would
pay Flores “$100,000 for every loss” during the 2019 season. 108 This situation is similar to the
fight fixing in that if Flores agreed to Ross’s overtures, the Miami Dolphins players would be
competing in a game in which they believed they had a honest chance of winning but in reality
would never be able to win because it had a predetermined outcome.
This type of sports corruption—that an NFL owner would intentionally lose games to
benefit in the NFL Draft—is not something that has ever been prosecuted under the Sports Bribery
Act. It is a type of sports corruption that strikes at the core of game integrity. The notion that NFL
team owners may lose games to win the best draft picks is a new type of issue that is far more
dangerous than point shaving or paying a player to fumble. The harm in this scenario reaches huge
amounts of people, starting with the players and continuing to other coaches, the other teams, the
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referees, the fans, the team employees, league executives, sponsoring businesses, advertisers, and
most importantly at this time of great change, the sports gambling companies.
If these allegations are true, Stephen Ross’s behavior skews betting lines and the entire
sports gambling ecosystem. Ross is not trying to make a quick buck like Henry Hill in 1979 on
Boston College by beating the point spread. Rather, Ross is dismantling the entire goal of
organized professional sport: to have a fair, undetermined outcome game in which people bet with
the belief that both sides are trying to win the game. This kind of assault on game integrity is not
something that the Sports Bribery Act can adequately handle. The statute targets outside gamblers
who attempt to affect players, for example, by paying players to shave points by missing shots. It
is not designed to hold team owners accountable. In fact, it has never handled any bribery occurring
inside any of the four major American sports leagues.
PART IV: Fixing the Owners’ Fixing Problem
The Sports Bribery Act needs to be amended to be amended to provide it with the ability
to combat NFL team owner game integrity misconduct. First, although there are few reported
incidences of game integrity violations in the major four American professional sports leagues,
this is most likely due to underreporting and the private nature in which the sports leagues handle
their affairs. Indeed, “it would be naïve to consider that with the rapid expansion of match-fixing
scandals happening abroad, the United States is immune or insulated from match-fixing.”109 After
all, since bribery transactions are usually done in secret, they are remarkably difficult to uncover
and prosecute.110 Second, individual teams are disincentivized to self-report their game integrity
infractions because the league commissioner would likely punish player or team personnel

109

See Holden, supra, note 25
See Jeffery Boles, Examining the Lax Treatment of Commercial Bribery in the United States: A Prescription for
Reform, 51 Am. Bus. L.J. 119, 158, 165 (2014).
110

23

financially and/or with lengthy suspensions which in turn would hamper the team’s ability to win
games and also hurt the team economically. The team would also likely suffer from public backlash
if it was forthcoming about game integrity issues. After all, the only reason why the allegations
against owner Stephen Ross became public is due to a race discrimination class action lawsuit filed
by former Dolphins Head Coach Brian Flores. If Flores did not file his lawsuit, it is possible the
allegations would not have surfaced. The lawsuit even incentivized other NFL insiders to reveal
that another owner, Jerry Halsam of the Cleveland Browns, allegedly behaved in a similar way by
offering Hue Jackson, the former head coach of the Browns, to lose games intentionally for a
higher draft pick in past seasons.111
Third, the professional sports landscape has changed considerably since 1964, the year the
Sports Bribery Act was signed. Among the most important changes concerning game integrity that
have come to pass are (1) the creation of free agency for players, which increased player salaries
considerably and should have a large deterrent on their choice to take bribes, (2) the rapid increase
in the value of television rights and the creation of the 24/7 sports television network, and (3) the
legalization of sports betting in the United States, which will inject unending amounts of money
into the industry and in result, greatly increase franchise values and, consequently, owners’ wealth
and power.
A. Amend the Sports Bribery Act to Reflect the Nature of the NFL Today
Multiple changes can be enacted to combat owner misconduct. First, the Sports Bribery
Act needs to impose direct liability on the people who are the guards of the game, particularly
team executives, league executives, and above all, team owners. Congress should amend the Sports
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Bribery Act to include a new section that is modeled off West Virginia’s statute against sports
bribery but specifically targets the owners. A reasonable proposal could read:
Any person who holds any position within a professional sports organization who
offers, promises, gives anything of value to anyone, or threatens anyone, for the
purpose of influencing the outcome of a race, sporting event, contest, or game upon
which a wager may be made, or a person in aforementioned position, who places,
increases, or decreases a wager after acquiring knowledge of inside information
within a team, shall be guilty of a felony and will be fined or imprisoned for no
more than seven years.112

Congress could send a strong message to the NFL by altering the Sports Bribery Act with a new
section that specifically targets team owners. The time is ripe to do so because multiple serious
allegations are surfacing about how owners are allegedly attempting to manipulate football game
outcomes for their personal financial gain. Additionally, the current Sports Bribery Act does not
“cover situations where means other than bribery are used to manipulate athletic contests, such as
extortion, blackmail, and duress.”113 There are a plethora of ways a team owner could blackmail,
extort, or induce duress in a player or coach to change the outcome of a game and avoid prosecution
under the current Sports Bribery Act. For instance, an owner could call the coach and threaten him
to lose games, or the owner will release private unflattering emails between himself and the coach.
This example constitutes blackmail but could not be prosecuted under the current Sports Bribery
Act. Under the proposed amended version, all forms of coercion would be covered, including
blackmail and duress.
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B. Deploy Consumer Fraud Laws Against NFL Owners
The NFL is potentially reaching a perilous point due to the simultaneous legalization of
sports gambling and alleged game fixing by team owners. Bettors and fans must be assured that
their bets are legitimate. Bettors will only bet with confidence if they are assured that the football
games in which they place wagers are not predetermined outcomes fixed by the team owners
themselves. An innovative way to hold owners financially liable for games they fixed would be
through state consumer fraud statutes. For example, if Miami Dolphins owner Stephen Ross is
found to have fixed games, Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) could
require Ross to may a monetary fee. Ross’s behavior could constitute “unfair methods of
competition,” or more likely, “unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce.”114 Ross’s conduct could be considered “unfair,” because unfair
practices under FDUTPA include conduct that “offends established public policy and is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” 115 During a time of
unprecedented entertainment and betting alternatives, fans and gamblers cannot be skeptical that
NFL games are rigged or predetermined. If viewers have doubts about the legitimacy of games,
attendance may drop, television viewership may decrease, and the NFL may fall to the wayside of
the entertainment ecosystem in American society. These new considerations demand new
solutions. Deploying consumer fraud statutes against owners who fix games that the public wagers
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on could shine a new spotlight on owner misconduct and re-frame the public conversation on game
integrity.
C. Create a Public Investigative Committee on Sport Integrity
The NFL hired Mary Jo White, the former Securities and Exchange Commission Chair, to
conduct an internal investigation into Miami Dolphins owner Stephen Ross’s alleged bribery.116
White is familiar with conducting internal investigations for the NFL, as she is currently
investigating Washington Commanders’ owner Daniel Snyder for inappropriate sexual conduct
and previously investigated former Carolina Panthers owner Jerry Ricardson on sexual harassment
allegations.117 Yet, the NFL’s launch of an internal investigation is insufficient to handle this
matter for multiple reasons. First, the NFL is White’s client. The NFL and the Miami Dolphins
have an interest in preserving their brand and would not benefit from incriminating evidence of
bribery becoming public information. Second, White cannot subpoena documents or witnesses,
which could create shortcomings in information White recovers. These considerations suggest that
internal investigations may not be the best route to uncover all the evidence in Ross’s case or any
future case involving bribery or game integrity allegations.
The best way to circumvent the issue of nonreporting among teams for misconduct on game
integrity at all levels of an NFL team is to create a public committee that can investigate allegations
of sport integrity issues for the four major American professional sports. Although it may be
difficult for the leagues to voluntarily relinquish some of their autonomy, it would be in their best
interest to do so for multiple reasons. First, it would show that the sports leagues, particularly the
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NFL, are putting in a good faith effort to combat game integrity problems. Second, it would
demonstrate to the public that the sports leagues care about their fans and their experience. Third,
it would put the United States on a similar footing as the European and Australian countries who
already have committees that ensure sports integrity. 118 Lastly, establishing a committee would rid
the sports world of the non-reporting problem. Since players, coaches, and other employees could
report game integrity concerns to an outside entity such as a Sport Integrity Committee, the fears
of whistleblowing, social ostracization, and retaliation could be significantly reduced. In result,
more claims of sport integrity could be filed, be more thoroughly investigated by outside counsel,
and appropriate remedies proposed.
Part V: Conclusion
NFL owners are successful and powerful executives who control every aspect of their
teams. Little stands in their way to make decisions, and, unfortunately, some owners conduct
themselves in ways that severely threaten the health of the game. When bribery or other serious
conspiracies occur at the top of an organization, the allegations must be vetted, investigated, and
if found to be accurate, punished. For too long, the focus has been on player misconduct.
Contemporary circumstances such as the injection of a new source of revenue in legalized sports
gambling and allegations of owners rigging the NFL Draft by fixing games could destroy the
public’s confidence in the NFL, and consequently, the game of American football itself.
The structure of the NFL presents a collective action problem which shields team owners
from accountability and punishment for game integrity issues such as bribery allegations. Players
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The Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions offers review of alleged match
fixing and publishes documents on how to combat sports integrity issues. See Fighting Match -Fixing, European
Union, https://sport.ec.europa.eu/policies/sport-and-integrity/fighting-match-fixing (last visited Apr. 20, 2022);
INTERPOL, the international law enforcement organization, has a Corruption in Sport Unit that investigates
allegations of match-fixing and other game integrity violations. Interpol, Corruption in Sport,
https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Corruption/Corruption -in-sport (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
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and coaches are dissuaded from bringing claims against executives or owners out of fear for
retaliation or jeopardizing their own careers. Additionally, from examining the history and use of
the Sports Bribery Act, it is not prepared for NFL team owner misconduct. For this reason, the
statute should be revised so that it is more comprehensive. Simple changes such as directly
referencing front office executives and owners and covering other forms of illicit coercive activity
such as blackmail and duress provide ways to prosecute current offenders and hopefully
disempower future offenders. Deploying state consumer fraud statutes to ensure sports gamblers
have recourse against fixed games ensures consumer confidence in a new era of ubiquitous sports
betting. Establishing an independent commission that focuses solely on promoting game integrity
in professional sports would allow whistleblowers to come forward with claims openly and would
provide an unbiased assessment of questionable conduct.
These changes require some effort, but do not mandate the overhaul of the American
professional sport structure. If the NFL Commissioner and team owners cannot adequately protect
the shield and guard the game, the U.S. Congress and the American people should guard the
guardians of the game, for the sake of the game.
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